As the population of the United States ages, there is increasing pressure to encourage people to work past the traditional retirement age. A concern with "pro-work" policies, government and employer policies encouraging older workers to remain in the labor force, has grown out of these pressures. For most of the 20th century, government and employer policies instead tended to be "pro-retirement," encouraging workers to exit the labor force at a set age. In this chapter, we discuss the waning of pro-retirement policies and the rise of pro-work policies, along with the possible futures for pro-work policies. Putting pro-work policies in the context of organized labor, economic conditions, and social conditions, we discuss the potential implications for employers, government, and individuals. Today, pro-work policies have largely eclipsed the pro-retirement policies that dominated prior to the 1960s. However, by transferring risk from employers and government to workers, they tend to encourage work while creating a population of workers who are not financially well protected by the system. Over the next few decades, developing and implementing pro-work policies that protect and include more vulnerable populations is a task for organized labor, employees, employers, and policymakers alike.
recent research has found that about one sixth of the increase in labor force participation from 1998 to 2004 among married men ages 65 to 67 was due to changes in Social Security policy alone (Gustman & Steinmeier, 2009) . While increased labor force participation among older adults has potentially positive effects for businesses and workers alike, we highlight both the advantages and potential risks of pro-work policies.
This chapter is divided into four major sections. First, we discuss the waning of pro-retirement policies and the rise of pro-work policies. Second, we examine the possible futures for pro-work policies. Third, we put pro-work policies in context by highlighting the importance of organized labor, economic conditions, and social conditions to understanding the effects of these policies.
Finally, we discuss the potential implications for employers, government, and individuals. By tracing the shifts from pro-retirement policies to pro-work policies from the mid-1900s until today, we show how expanding opportunities for working late in life have included both advantages and disadvantages. While the pro-work influence is not likely to change over the next few decades, a detailed understanding of current pro-work policies may help sensitize us to possible pitfalls when related policies are under consideration in the future.
From Pro-Retirement to Pro-Work Policies
This section will discuss several examples of pro-retirement policies, which predominated prior to 1990, and the shift away from them. While the benefits of pro-work policies are discussed, the potentially negative repercussions for certain subgroups are also highlighted. We focus on three major policies: mandatory retirement, Social Security policy changes surrounding the earnings test, and the shift from defined-benefit to defined-contribution pension plans.
effectively outlawed mandatory retirement for the vast majority of older Americans (Neumark, 2003) .
The ADEA, both by outlawing mandatory retirement and by forbidding most age-based discrimination, is one of the most visible landmarks of the pro-work landscape. However, the interpretation, effectiveness, and necessity of age discrimination law have remained controversial.
Many of the original arguments against the necessity of outlawing mandatory retirement in the United States have been mirrored in the recent debates about mandatory retirement in Canada and Great Britain. Some feared that while these laws might reduce age discrimination, they would weaken workers' claims to pensions by making retirement culturally viewed as "voluntary." For instance, Macnicol (2006) argues that mandatory retirement serves important functions by allowing older workers to save face and dealing with declining abilities with age. More importantly, he suggests that eliminating mandatory retirement makes it expected that older workers will continue working, and "forcing older citizens to 'work till they drop' may be the ultimate form of ageism" (p. 226). Palmore (2006) points out that there is a large difference between forcing older workers to continue working and allowing older workers to continue working, but most of the strongest arguments against eliminating mandatory retirement have been about the more subtle effects of such a policy change on expectations.
The effectiveness of laws concerning age discrimination has not been widely researched, but some research suggests that age discrimination legislation leads to increased labor force participation among older adults. For instance, found that state and federal anti-age discrimination laws were associated with increased labor force participation among older adults. However, outlawing mandatory retirement may have smaller effects on labor force participation than otherwise expected, simply because many people choose to retire before the mandatory retirement age due to pension and Social Security incentives. Also, because most charges of age discrimination surround promotion and firing of older workers, the ADEA may have had the unintentional consequence of reducing hiring of the older group of workers. Adams (2004) found that age discrimination laws had a large negative effect on the hiring of individuals age 65 and older. In part, this may be due to Lazear's (1979) observation that mandatory retirement was reductions were actuarially fair because they compensated workers for their losses while working with higher benefits in later years, but most workers saw the tax on their Social Security benefits as a direct loss to them. Hence, the earnings test was widely viewed as a disincentive to work at older ages (Engelhardt & Kumar, 2007) .
Beginning in the 1950s, for social and economic reasons, the emphasis shifted from discouraging work to encouraging work and savings. Hence, from the 1970s until today, the exempt amount (the amount a person can earn that is exempt from the earnings test tax), the affected age groups, and the tax rate have gradually changed to be less unfavorable to continued work while receiving Social Security benefits. In 1978, the exempt amount was increased by about 25% for workers ages 65 to 71, and in 1983 the earnings test was eliminated for workers ages 70 and 71. For those ages 65 to 69, the exempt amount was increased beginning in 2002 (Friedberg, 2000) . The common feature of these changes was that they mostly addressed workers who had typically already left the labor force. In 2000, the Senior Citizens Freedom to Work Act abolished the Social Security retirement earnings test for those aged 65 to 69. The rationale for removing the earnings test above the full retirement age was to encourage older people to work so their savings and earnings would supplement Social Security benefits (Song & Manchester, 2007) . The earnings test remains in place for workers ages 62 to 64.
For workers affected by the earnings test, future benefits were increased to offset amounts removed by the earnings test. However, researchers have generally argued that workers ignore these future increases and tend to perceive the earnings test as a pure tax (Loughran & Haider, 2007; Mastrobuoni, 2006a) . And although the earnings test was substantially relaxed, it remained a deterrent to continued work throughout the 1990s. In 1998, for every additional $2 that a worker under age 65 earned above $9,120, his or her benefits were reduced by $1. This amounted to a 50% tax on wages. For every $1 earned above the $14,500 exempt amount, workers ages 65 to 69 faced a 33% loss of benefits (Friedberg, 2000) . The net result was that people were often compensated more for not working than they were for working.
Despite the popular attention paid to the earnings test, research throughout the 1990s suggested that it had only small effects on labor force participation (Burtless & Moffitt, 1985; Gruber & Orszag, 2002; Gustman & Steinmeier, 1985) . More recent studies such as Friedberg (2000) and Loughran and Haider (2007) have found larger effects. Baker and Benjamin (1999) , in a study of the earnings test in Canada, found similarly large effects. The more recent research has benefited from additional data such as being able to study the changes in the earnings test over time. For instance, Friedberg (2000) studied three shifts in the earnings test, concluding that workers tend to cluster around the exempt amount in substantial numbers. Recent research on the Senior Citizens Freedom to Work Act of 2000 suggests even larger effects. For instance, Engelhardt and Kumar (2007) reported that repealing the earnings test increased labor supply by 12% to 17%. Despite these recent findings, there is still controversy about the extent to which the earnings test affects labor force participation.
Current research on the effects of the 2000 removal of the earnings test also highlights a troubling aspect. For the most part, changes to the earnings test affected labor force participation and earnings among highest earners and least-vulnerable groups. For instance, Engelhardt and Kumar (2007) found that the strongest effects of removing the earnings test occurred among men with a high-school degree compared to women and men without a high-school degree. Loughran and Haider (2007) similarly found that the effects of the earnings test are concentrated among younger men. For instance, the 2000 modifications to the earnings test affected 65-to 69-year-old men, who were better able to take advantage of these changes than the age 70 and 71 cohort that the 1983 modifications affected. The effects are far less pronounced for women. Similarly, Song (2003 Song ( /2004 and Song and Manchester (2007) argued that eliminating the earnings test caused only some workers to increase their earnings, in particular high earners. This is not surprising, in that low-wage workers often would not exceed the original exempt amount in earnings, and finding adequately paying jobs was often more of a problem than avoiding having their benefits reduced.
Despite the lack of an effect among low-wage workers, these workers rely upon Social Security for large proportions of their retirement income. For example, among elders in the lowest income quintile (the lowest one fifth of incomes), Social Security represents 83% of their total annual income. Among elders (age 65 and older) in the highest income quintile (the highest one fifth of incomes), Social Security represents 20% of their total annual income (Gonyea, 2007) . Hence, repealing the earnings test above the normal retirement age most benefited the workers who depend the least on the Social Security benefits.
Elimination of the earnings test above the normal retirement age has had at least modest effects on the labor force participation of older adults, particularly high wage earners. However, it has substantially smaller effects on low-wage workers who rely most on Social Security for their retirement income.
Defined-Benefit and Defined-Contribution Pensions
Company-paid and -sponsored pensions appeared during World War II and spread in the affluent decades that followed (Gonyea, 2007) . These company-paid plans were predominantly definedbenefit plans, which provided workers at their retirement with a lifetime annuity, based on their earnings and years of service within a company. Up until the 1970s, nearly three quarters of workers with a pension had defined-benefit plans. These plans tended to be pro-retirement in that they encouraged workers to retire at a certain age. However, beginning in the 1980s, the predominant type of pension plan began to shift to defined-contribution plans, which relied on worker and employer contributions. At retirement the worker received the account balance. By 2001, 77% of pension-covered workers had defined-contribution plans (Even & MacPherson, 2007) . Defined-contribution plans tend to be pro-work in that they do not penalize workers for continued employment .
Defined-benefit plans worked best in situations where an employee had lifetime employment with one large firm and retired at exactly the age specified in the pension plan. The most traditional defined-benefit plans offered workers income security in old age (Gonyea, 2007) . However, they also discouraged continued work past the accepted retirement age. Under these plans, pension wealth accumulated slowly during early years on the job, accelerated after many years of tenure, then slowed or even decreased at the end of a worker's career. A typical defined-benefit plan encouraged workers to remain at a single job for 25 to 30 years, then encouraged an abrupt retirement (Friedberg & Webb, 2005) . Because they were often structured in such a way that the value of expected future benefits fell with each additional year on the job (beyond the expected retirement age), remaining on the job was a real financial loss to workers, even accounting for the the decades since its passage, 401(k)s and similar defined-contribution plans have displaced most private-sector defined-benefit plans. The striking growth of 401(k) plans has been accompanied by a marked decline in defined-benefit plans.
The shift away from defined-benefit plans substantially reduced pension-related disincentives to continued work. Because pension wealth does not necessarily decrease at a particular age, workers with defined-contribution plans tend to retire later than workers with defined-benefit plans (Friedberg & Webb, 2005) . However, the pro-work pension changes also had several unintentional effects.
First, under defined-benefit plans, employers were obligated to cover promised benefits. Hence, employers bore most of the risk associated with investments and other uncertainties. Under definedcontribution plans, these risks fall entirely to the worker. Defined-contribution plans expose employees to investment risk that they were insulated from in defined-benefit plans (Even & MacPherson, 2007; Vickerstaff & Coz, 2005) . The potentially dramatic impact of market risk was all too evident in connection with the recent stock market meltdown (Munnell, Golub-Sass, & Muldoon, 2009 ).
Second, under defined-contribution plans, contribution rates and eventual retirement wealth tend to be more variable than under defined-benefit plans (Poterba, Rauh, Venti, & Wise, 2007) . In particular, less-educated, lower-wage, and younger workers tend to accrue less pension wealth (Even & MacPherson, 2007) . For instance, from 1989 to 1998, even while defined-contribution plans were rapidly growing in wealth due to the performance of the stock market, the mean pension wealth fell for workers with 12 or fewer years of education . While definedcontribution plans offer many advantages, they also create cracks through which vulnerable populations, such as low-wage workers, women, and persons of color, disproportionately fall (Gonyea, 2007) .
Third, compared to defined-benefit plans, defined-contribution pensions lead to more inequality of pension wealth due to financial choices at retirement. In theory, it is possible that workers will accumulate more wealth or make more contributions to savings with defined-contribution plans (Even & MacPherson, 2007; Poterba, Rauh, Venti, & Wise, 2007; Poterba, Venti, & Wise, 2001 ; Deleted: Samwick & Skinner, 2004; . However, the mix of stocks and bonds in workers' defined-contribution plans can have a major effect on their eventual pension wealth (Blank, 1999) , and poor financial planning can lead to major problems at retirement. Wealth accumulation under 401(k)s is further complicated by the practice of "cashing out" accumulated 401(k) funds to buy homes, finance education, or care for an aging parent. In the face of immediate financial needs, many workers may choose to reduce their retirement savings (Gonyea, 2007) . Financial decisions, whether well or poorly thought out, easily can also erode pension wealth in a defined-contribution plan. While in theory workers covered by 401(k) plans could do well, in practice this often does not happen. A major reason is that workers bear the risk burden by themselves, and their control over decision-making translates into "mistakes at every step along the way" (Munnell & Sundén, 2004, pp. 173-174) .
Defined-contribution plans fit well with the economic and social realities of today, but they are also somewhat problematic. While they may have modest long-term positive effects on overall retirement wealth, especially as compared to no pension plan at all, they also lead to greater inequality in eventual pension wealth, with low-wage workers, women, and persons of color the most likely to be adversely affected.
A Future for Pro-Work Policies?
Pro-work policies are well entrenched in today's landscape, but what is their future? This section will discuss the future of pro-work policies, with a focus on three types of policies: federal legislation not specifically aimed toward labor force participation among older adults, Social Security changes that are only recently being phased in, and employer policies designed to encourage continued labor force participation. Attention is paid both to the advantages of these programs and their potential pitfalls.
Federal Legislation Concerning Older Adults
Unlike pension and Social Security law, some of the programs affecting older workers were broader in their original aims. For instance, the Older Americans Act (OAA) of 1965 created a number of programs that directly or indirectly boosted the employment opportunities of older Americans. The Act grew out of increasing concerns about older Americans, beginning with the first National Conference on Aging held in 1950. By 1962, over 160 aging-related bills were introduced in Congress, largely because of the lack of resources and services for older adults. In the early 1960s, almost half of all Americans over 65 had less than $1,000 a year in income, and few social and health programs existed for their benefit (Wallace, McGuire, Lee, & Sauter, 1999) . The OAA was first approved in 1965 by President Johnson as part of his Great Society programs (Wallace, McGuire, Lee, & Sauter, 1999) . It included a number of provisions for older workers, such as the establishment of the Administration on Aging (AoA), which advocates for programs related to older adults within the federal government; the creation of a number of state and community programs designed to meet the needs of older persons on a community level; and the authorization of the discretionary funds program, intended to build knowledge about older adults . Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the OAA was revised to expand programs and services to a larger network. In the 1990s, additional amendments focused on providing services to vulnerable elders (Wallace, McGuire, Lee, & Sauter, 1999) . The Act established a number of programs that might indirectly promote work among older adults, although this was not the stated goal.
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 similarly might affect older adults differently than younger adults. The main objective of Title 1 of the ADA, which forbade employers from discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability, was to increase the wages and employment of people with disabilities (ADA, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 1990 ). The population of adults with disabilities is extremely diverse (Baldwin, 1997), and in fact older workers are less likely to report short-term disability that has caused them to lose work. However, when they are injured, they are likely to take more time off than younger workers. By some estimates more than three quarters of long-term disability cases are for workers over the age of 40.
In part, this is because of the type of disabilities they experience. The most common disabilities among older workers tend to be cancer, mental health disorders, musculoskeletal disorders, and circulatory disorders (UnumProvident, 2005) . Substantial numbers of older adults suggest that disability is a major reason they leave the labor force. A 2008 study found that among early retirees, more than half said that they retired due to a health problem or disability (Helman, Copeland, VanDerhei, & Salisbury, 2008) . Because the consequences of long-term disability tend to be more continue working from taking early Social Security benefits, it could also cause serious financial problems for workers who must stop working due to health reasons or lack of available jobs.
Second, because Social Security disability benefits are not affected by age, claims for disability benefits have risen steadily. Duggan, Singleton, and Song (2007) outline possibly reasons for the steady increase in workers receiving Social Security disability benefits. A 1984 policy change liberalized the program's medical eligibility criteria, allowing more potential beneficiaries to apply.
The aging of the Baby Boom generation means more workers experience long-term disability and need to apply for disability. And, perhaps most importantly, the increase in the age for eligibility to collect full retirement benefits means that many disabled older adults who would otherwise apply for retirement benefits instead apply for disability benefits. The changes to the retirement program can explain more than one third of the increase in male disability enrollment and one quarter of the increase in female disability enrollment. While disability provides financial assistance, it does not carry the same sense of entitlement as retirement benefits do. Hence, workers who need to apply for disability benefits may suffer from negative social stigma.
Pro-Work Employer Policies
As institutional barriers to continued employment past the typical retirement age have decreased, increasing attention has been paid to employer policies specifically designed to promote later retirement among employees with "in demand" skill sets. Many of these policies encourage a nontraditional exit from the labor force, such as part-time work or flexible schedules. The traditional pathway out of the labor force, where a worker goes from full-time work to retirement abruptly, is becoming less common. For example, Maestes (2007) found that nearly 50% of retirees followed a nontraditional path involving partial retirement or "reverse retirement" (i.e., returning to the labor force after retirement). While these policies can be very advantageous to older workers who want to continue to work, they are often not made available to all workers at a company because they are used as incentives to keep skilled workers. We discuss three examples below: flexible work schedules, part-time work, and phased retirement.
First, flexible work schedules, which allow workers to change their start and quit times, work different days of the week, or otherwise reshape their schedule to better fit their lifestyle, encourage workers (Mermin, Johnson, & Toder, 2008) , part-time work has the potential to grow as a strategy for workers above the typical retirement age.
Flexible schedules, phased retirement, and part-time work are all pro-work policies in that workers generally say they will work past the typical age of retirement if they have access to these policies. However, despite their potential, there are a number of criticisms of these employer policies.
First, the availability of these options tends to be focused among more affluent workers. Most workers who successfully phase into second careers come from professional jobs and a college education (Metlife, 2008) . Similarly, as McMenamin (2007) finds, white and Asian workers are more likely to have access to flexible schedules than are black workers and workers with Hispanic ethnicity. He also finds that men are more likely than women to have access to flexible schedules.
Despite the popularity of these pro-work policies among workers, they are often available only to the most affluent older adults.
Second, using pro-work policies can often lead to reduced wages and benefits. While the majority of white-collar employees have opportunities for phased retirement, those opportunities can carry a loss of health insurance, pension coverage, or wages (Hutchens, 2003; . Only 6% of employers offer phased retirement without job sharing, without changes in health insurance, with pension payments, and with the ability to return to full-time work at some later date (Hutchens & Chad, 2004) . Also, workers who move to a new job to try to gain access to these benefits often find that their wages drop considerably. Similarly, when moving to a new job, almost a quarter of workers lose health insurance, while only 10% gain it (Johnson, Kawachi, & Lewis, 2009) . Part-time work carries similar risks. Many older adults believe it would not be possible to reduce their current work hours on the job (Henretta, 2000) , and in fact since the mid1990s increasing numbers of older workers are working full-time (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2008) . In part, this may be a reflection of employer policies. Fewer than half of employers would allow at least some employees to move from full-time to part-time work while remaining at the same position or level (Galinsky, Bong, & Sakai, 2008) . Only 17% of the employers reported offering health insurance to families of part-time employees (Pitt-Catsouphes, Smyer, Matz-Costa, Labor unions have traditionally been unresponsive to the issues of pro-work or pro-retirement policy and have instead seemed happy to maintain the current work-retirement life trajectory. Due to the importance of seniority-based salaries, issues of representing interests of older and younger members (as well as full-and part-time workers), and the strength of current union pension programs, labor organizations have tended to favor traditional retirement at age 65 or younger.
Traditional retirement age has operated in unionized workplaces for over a century, allowing workers with less seniority to move up the pay scale following the retirement of older members and therefore opening entry-level jobs for new workers exiting union-trainee programs. While there may be some difference in union policy towards retirement between so-called "white-collar" and "blue-collar" jobs, several studies Pitt-Catsouphes, Sano, & Matz-Costa, 2009 ) have found that unionized workplaces are less likely to offer pro-work programs and policies for older workers. While unions have been generally unresponsive to pro-work policies up to this point, there are possibilities, such as union-administered older worker retraining programs, that may influence unions to support such initiatives.
Research on Pro-Work Policies in Unionized Workplaces
Research investigating union reactions to pro-work policies has heavily focused on the lack of prowork opportunities, particularly phased retirement, in unionized and non-unionized workplaces.
Such studies have found that employees at unionized workplaces have significantly less access to phased retirement than employees at non-unionized workplaces (Grace-Martin & .
In a study of 950 establishments, Grace-Martin and found that unionization was particularly important in predicting the availability of phased retirement options for white-collar workers. The researchers found that among workplaces permitting phased retirement, 16% of whitecollar workers were unionized, while 29% of establishments that forbid phased retirement were unionized (2006, p. 532). Even after controlling for region, industry, and workplace size, the researchers found that unionized workplaces were less likely to offer a phased retirement option.
Since the researchers also found that employers offering phased retirement favored informal agreements, they suggested that unions' distaste for these non-contractual deals contributes to the receiving the same salary based on their years with the company rather than on individual productivity, specific skills, or education levels (Bayo-Moriones, Galdon-Sanchez, & Guell, 2004) .
This type of group-based arrangement is the heart of most union collective bargaining agreements and is based on the principle than employees can garner more power in their pay and benefit arrangements if they negotiate as a group rather than as individuals.
The issue of seniority-based pay is important to the discussion of pro-work policies because phased retirement agreements are typically negotiated on an individual basis. Casey (1997) explains that unions may be opposed to programs such as phased retirement because of the individual pay systems that often accompany phased and flexible retirement arrangements. It is likely that unions would want to create particular contract agreements dealing with pay arrangements for such prowork policies in order to determine a group-based rather than individual system for these employees. This could prove difficult, as employees with differing degrees of seniority may choose phased retirement at the same age but at different pay steps. It may be that unions agree to a percentage of the tiered income the employee was receiving when the phased retirement began or another similar arrangement. Still, as Casey (1997) suggests, this setup may still be too individualized for the unions' tastes.
Pension Benefits
Much of the labor movement's traditional pro-retirement philosophy may come from the likelihood that unionized employees will have more substantial pension benefits for their retirement.
According to the AFL-CIO, 79% of union workers are covered by pension plans, compared with only 44% of non-union workers. Of these groups, 79% of union workers have defined-benefit retirement coverage, compared with only 16% of non-union workers (AFL-CIO, 2009 ). This means that while the union workers are guaranteed a monthly fixed income from the employer-provided retirement pension, the non-union workers' benefits more likely depend on variable monthly income from market-dependent defined-contribution plans. In addition to having an AFL-CIOdubbed "union advantage" in retirement pensions, unionized workers also are more likely to have retiree healthcare and disability benefits than non-unionized workers. These comparisons break down to 80% to 49% and 62% to 35%, respectively (AFL-CIO, 2009).
Though several researchers have found that unionized workplaces are less likely to offer pro-work policies to employees, some unions have worked with employers to offer such programs (New York State Controller Office, 2004) . Due to the power of lawmakers to influence public sector employment, as well as their lower physical demands, these job opportunities seem to be most available to white-collar employees in the public sector. One example is the program New York State offers to its public employees, which has been secured through state legislation. Sections 211 and 212 of the New York State Retirement and Social Security Law allow retirees the ability to return to work after they have formally retired and are receiving their state pension. While this is seen as a pro-work policy that encourages post-retirement age employment, earnings for returning retirees cannot exceed a statutory limit computed on a calendar year basis. For example, in connection with Section 212 the earnings limit (per calendar year) is $30,000, regardless of the employee's salary at the time of retirement. If employees exceed that limit, they will forfeit their pension money or the state will terminate their post-retirement employment. Either way, employees will receive a service credit for their time employed.
The second program, Section 211 of the same legislation, allows retirees to return to work at any salary level and for any public employer without any decrease of retirement benefits. While there is no earnings cap as in Section 212, employees returning to work under 211 legislation receive no additional service credit to their years as a public employee, which they do receive from Section 212. The law was recently changed to disallow any return to the same or a very similar position for any time over one calendar year (police officers are excluded). This recent legislation reflects a conflict between retirees and younger workers hoping to advance into the retirees' vacated positions (New York State Controller Office, 2004) .
Each of these programs was negotiated through state legislation based on lobbying efforts from the Organization of Management Confidential Employees (OMCE), a labor guild associated with the larger Office and Professional Employees International Union (OPEIU) and the Civil Service Employees Association (CSEA), the labor union for New York State public employees. These programs are one example of how labor unions took the initiative to implement pro-work policies and balanced demands of younger and older members. It is also clear that these types of programs main study of the Active Aging initiative, called "Workforce Aging for the New Economy" (WANE), to workforce training. As an example, Canada has implemented a WANE-based initiative that involves retraining older workers to fill roles most needed in the economy, often including those of a technological nature. An Active Aging-type initiative could also influence policies in the United States, which would affect the efficacy of pro-work programs.
Job training and retraining would likely be an area of interest to labor unions as they already have experience in their apprenticeship training programs. Also, unions, especially those in the public sector, also often offer training programs to their members focused on technological and computer-based skills. It is possible that one way to encourage labor unions to support pro-work policies would be to involve them in the training and retraining of older employees. It seems likely that if unions were to have a voice in the design and implementation of these training programs, they would be more likely to support pro-work initiatives for older workers, and this would make the programs more efficient.
Health Insurance
A second policy issue that will affect the efficacy of pro-work policies is employee health insurance. As the cost of healthcare increases, it is also an increasing concern for employers and all workers, but especially for older workers, who often have higher healthcare costs than their younger counterparts. Providing a comparison, a 1995 study of companies in the United Kingdom found that employers stated pension costs as the number-one deterrent from hiring older workers, noting that the British government provides employee health insurance (Auer & Fortuny, 2002) . In the United States, many companies have already addressed high pension costs by switching from definedbenefit to defined-contribution pension plans, and in recent years employers have begun to adopt similar policies in regards to health benefits. This issue is especially important to labor unions, who have historically touted their ability to provide the most healthcare coverage to their members, including older workers and retirees.
Older workers, labor unions, and healthcare advocates may worry that pro-work policies could allow employers to avoid funding healthcare costs for aging workers phasing into retirement. As healthcare has recently been a pivotal political and social issue, in order for these groups to support resulting from these programs (Policy Research Initiative, 2005) , others, including the United States, hear increasingly of the discrimination older workers face in the workforce (Levitz & Shishkin, 2009 Levitz & Shishkin, 2009 ). These researchers relate these age-bias claims to layoffs that older employees have faced in the recent economic downturn, which is discussed further below.
One method countries have used to counter age discrimination is the creation of a pro-work culture that makes it more socially acceptable for older workers to remain in the workforce. One example of such a program in Finland, "Finland for People of All Ages," focuses on providing opportunities for skilled and able-bodied older Finns to continue to work and/or to re-enter the workforce (Policy Research Initiative, 2005) . The program is based on values of intergenerational solidarity, as well as gender and generational equity. The program also aims to increase incentives and reduce barriers to employment for retirement-age workers in hopes that they will remain in the workforce. The program has taken advantage of the increasingly rare skills older workers often hold and has encouraged prolonged workforce participation that benefits the workers and the government. Modeling these efforts in the United States would allow for an easier transition from the introduction to the implementation of pro-work policies with an anti-discrimination focus.
The Current Economic Downturn
The current economic downturn will also have long-term effects on the prospects of older workers and on the implementation of any pro-work policies. Since older workers tend to have higher wages and more lucrative benefits, they frequently cannot find jobs that pay what they desire in unfavorable job markets (Levitz & Shishkin, 2009) . As a result they either experience longer periods of unemployment or choose to retire early and exit the job market. In May 2009, the unemployment rate in the United States stood at 9.4%, with an unemployment rate of 7.0% for workers aged 55 and over (U.S. Department of Labor, 2009 ). This number is most likely understated due to the fact that many older workers simply retire early after losing their jobs, rather than "actively seeking employment," and are therefore not considered in the unemployment statistic, adding to the impact of the recession on aging employees. long-term economic growth. In the short term, however, creating an environment in which older adults are expected to work can lead to negative social and economic repercussions for these adults when the economy is weak and jobs are scarce.
Many pro-work policy changes, such as the Social Security Amendments of 1983, are designed specifically to improve the solvency of those programs. They primarily aim to do so by encouraging longer working lives and hence collecting more payroll taxes. However, some of these policy changes are costly. For example, increasing the Social Security retirement age led to increased costs for the disability program (Duggan, Singleton, & Song, 2007) . Other costs are more direct, such as the substantial amount of funding required to administer ADEA.
Some of the pro-work changes were made specifically to improve the conditions of older adults.
OAA, for instance, was designed to improve the quality of life of older adults. However, as discussed above, these policies tend to carry additional risks for older adults. The shift to definedcontribution pensions, in particular, will lead to wider variability in the assets of older Americans.
In the coming years, policymakers may find that controlling the unintentional effects of pro-work policies is as important as finding the policies that best encourage labor force participation.
From an Employer Standpoint
Employers face a different set of issues when considering pro-work policies. These include potential issues managing the multigenerational workforce, administration of pro-work programs, and balancing the programs available to high-wage and low-wage workers whom they employ. (2006) note that employees with defined-benefit pension plans tend to face obstacles when considering phased retirement due to IRS regulations.
A second issue that will be important to employees when considering pro-work policies is their physical and mental health. Several researchers (e.g., Sterns & Sterns, 1995) have found that many Americans are physically able to work past the traditional retirement age of 65 and even 70 if the job responsibilities are matched to the older worker's abilities. To be successful, pro-work policies would need to be sensitive to the physical limitations of older workers and match older workers to jobs fitting their physical capabilities.
In regards to mental well-being, it seems that pro-work policies could improve the mental health of older Americans. Researchers have found that retirement is often accompanied by feelings of depression and negative self-esteem, especially for those who retire before age 62 (Butterworth, Gill, Rodgers, Anstev, Villamil, & Melzer, 2006; Reitzes, Mutran, & Fernandez, 1996) . Other studies have found that retirement increases feelings of alienation and isolation and decreases social interaction among older people (Drentea, 1999) . These findings suggest that retirement often has a negative impacts on the psychosocial health of older citizens. Pro-work policies designed to offer opportunities to aging workers who may postpone retirement may prevent many of the isolating effects of retirement and decrease the impact that the drastic change from full-time employee to retiree has on some older workers.
From the Labor Standpoint
As explained earlier, pro-work policies may create difficult scenarios for labor unions trying to organize a workplace. Older part-time workers may not be eligible for union membership and collective bargaining, regardless of previous union membership. However, if unions are allowed to represent and negotiate contracts for these part-time employees, such policies could increase union membership and strength. With the diversification of membership unions may face problems representing interests of part-time and full-time employees. As such, any shift to pro-work policies would bring many issues to the table for organized labor.
First, organized labor may worry that pro-work policies, such as phased retirement, would lead to individualized pay schemes and informal agreements rather than contracts negotiated through
